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UNWARRANTED TAX ADVANTAGES IN
CORPORATE FINANCING
SHAREHOLDER GUARANTEED LOANS
JOHN V. GUIGON t
INTRODUCTION
APART from the tax considerations of corporate financing
which will be dealt with in detail subsequently, there is,
with but one exception, no benefit derived nor disadvantage
avoided whether the funding of the enterprise is effected by
the issuance of stock, debt obligations or a combination of
both. All funds coming into the corporate treasury are
placed into the melting pot of "risk capital." The exception
alluded to assumes corporate insolvency, in which case the
investors, to the extent of their bond or other debt holdings,
will generally receive creditors' rights over those holding
solely proprietary interests.'
Considered in the light of our revenue laws, however, a
plan of debt financing, as will shortly be seen, presents sev-
eral attractive benefits unavailable to a funding operation
dependent exclusively, or to a large extent, upon original and
subsequent stock issues. Dissatisfied with tax advantages at-
tendant a reasonable balance between these two interests,
some have placed undue emphasis upon borrowed capital
thereby overloading the corporation with debt obligations and
relegating equitable investments to a position of slight and
even token significance. Thus, frequent but often unsuccess-
ful use has been made of the "thin" or undercapitalized
venture.2
t Member of the New York and Federal Bars.
'But see Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939)
(Deep Rock doctrine).
2 See Bryson, Stockholder Loans: "Thin" Capitalizations, N.Y.U. 8TH INST.
oN Fun. TAX. 732 (1950); De Stefano, Stock Or Debt-That Is The Question,
18 FORDHAm L. REv. 251 (1949); LeSourd, Tax Treatment Of Stockholders'
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The scope of this article will be confined, in the main, to
a discussion and evaluation of several quite recent cases
which may possibly open new avenues of tax avoidance via
the "thin incorporation" route. Succinctly stated the ques-
tion is: can the possible consequences attending a judicial or
administrative interdiction of excessive thinning, in the case
of direct shareholder loans, be effectively avoided by securing
an outsider's loan guaranteed by an insider-shareholder?
Discussion of this question will be mainly directed to the un-
successful corporation, although consideration will also be
given to the profitable corporation which is accumulating
surplus in order to retire its obligations.
STOCK OR DEBT--TAx CONSEQUENCES
It is necessary to note some of the more important and
readily apparent distinctions between these two interests.
Thus, if an obligation is considered a debt, interest payments
are deductible by the corporation, 3 while a contrary finding
would require such payments to be deemed dividends for
which no deduction is obtainable. Receipt of interest pay-
ments is taxable in full whether the recipient be an individual
or a corporation.4 However, if such installment payments
are deemed to be dividends and are received by a corporation,
the Internal Revenue Code provides for an 85% dividends
received deduction,5 while an individual taxpayer would bene-
fit by a $50 exclusion 6 and a credit against tax equal to 47
of the dividends included within gross income. 7  Notwith-
standing the character of the recipient, taxation of dividends
is, of course, dependent upon the presence of earnings and
profits. 8 Worthless securities, including stock and certain
Advances (How Thick Must Be A Thin Corporation), 28 WASH. L. Ray. 29
(1953) ; Rohrlich, Some Current Thoughts On Corporate Capitalization. 1 VAND.
L. REv. 553 (1948) ; Schlesinger, Acceptable Capital Structures: How Thin Is
Too Thin?, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 355 (1952) ; Semmel, Loan Versus Investment-
Inadequate Capitalization, 5 TAX L. REv. 424 (1950).
3 INTe. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 162, 163.
4Id. § 61 (a) (4).
5Id. § 243(a).
6 1d. § 116(a).
7 Id. § 34(a). See subdivision (b) for limitations on the amount of credit.
8Id. § 316(a).
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instruments of indebtedness in registered form or bearing in-
terest coupons, result in capital loss." If the obligation is
found to be a debt, worthlessness thereof will result in short
term capital loss, i.e., a non-business bad debt deduction,"0
unless incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business or unless
the taxpayer happens to be a corporation. 1 Statutory tests
have been promulgated under the 1954 Code to determine
whether stock redemptions or bond retirements shall receive
capital gain or ordinary income treatment.' If the debt obli-
gation does not fall within the scope of the new bond retire-
ment provision, taxable income will be realized only on the
difference between the basis of the obligation and the redemp-
tion price. In addition, gain or loss may be realized by the
corporation if retirement is at a discount or a premium.'3
A shareholder may withdraw a part of the earnings tax
free because repayment of an advance does not constitute
taxable income, whereas a dividends tax would be proper
if the original "loan" was deemed a capital contribution.
Should the venture prove unprofitable, it is well settled that,
as the corporation's business is not that of the shareholder, 4
debt obligations, in the ordinary situation, will give rise to a
non-business bad debt deduction provided the stockholder-
lender is not engaged in the business of lending money.15 On
the other hand, one may be cast in the role of promoter rather
than that of a passive investor. Thus, where a substantial
amount of the promoter's time, energy and, perhaps even
9 Id. § 165(g). The loss will be long term unless the instrument is pur-
chased on or after July 1 in the year of worthlessness.
'Old. § 166(d).
1" Id. § 166 (a), (d). The non-business bad debt provision is inapplicable to
corporations. Note also that no deductions may be taken for non-business bad
debts proving only partially worthless.
12 Id. § 302 (a), (b). Generally, if the taxpayer meets the requirements of
(b) (1), (2) or (3), capital gain or loss will, in most instances, result upon
stock redemptions. If Section 302 is not satisfied, a dividend tax will usually
be imposed to the extent of earnings and profits. Section 1232(a) sets forth
the test which will determine the amounts of capital gain or loss or ordinary
income on the retirement of bonds and other evidences of indebtedness falling
within the scope of this section.
13 But see INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 332(c).
'14Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932) (dictum); Omaha Nat'l Bank
v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 899, 901 (8th Cir. 1950) (dictum).
15 Commissioner v. Smith, 203 F.2d 310, 312 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 816 (1953).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
money, are spent in the pursuit of organizing or investing in
business enterprises, business bad debt deductions have been
sustained on the ground that such activities constitute a
regular business separate and distinct from that of the
corporation. 6
Classification of a corporation as a personal holding
company '7 or a regulated investment company I may well
depend upon determination of the question, "stock or debt."
The results of such a finding could have repercussions in the
area of corporate organizations and reorganizations. 9 The
retention of corporate earnings to meet maturing obligations
will not usually run afoul of the accumulated earnings tax,
20
whereas the imposition of this penalty tax would undoubtedly
be much more likely if a particular security or obligation
represented, in effect, equity capital.
STOCK OR DEBT-JUDICIALLY DEVELOPED CRITERIA
Many attempts have been made to employ the vehicle of
undercapitalization in order to secure tax advantages which
would not otherwise be available. Not infrequently these
attempts would take the form of hybrid securities issued by
the corporation purporting both to embody the advantages
and avoid the consequences of these two types of interest.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the courts early developed
specific and now well established criteria to determine the
question "stock or debt."
16 "A person of property, who devotes his time to the active management of
it and also to active participation in the management of the companies in which
his property is invested, and who maintains an office for that purpose where
he spends a substantial part of his time, is carrying on business within the
meaning of this statute." Foss v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326, 327-28 (1st Cir.
1935). A. Kingsley Ferguson, 16 T.C. 1248, 1257 (1951) (dictum) (note also
dissent of Tietjens, J. at 1259) ; see Vincent C. Campbell, 11 T.C. 510 (1948) ;
Friedman, Bad Debts: Business or Non-Business?, 5 TAX L. REv. 412 (1950);
Holland, Tax Effects of Stockholder Loans to Corporations, N.Y.U. 9TH INST.
ON FED. TAX. 1083 (1951).
17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 541-547.
Is Id. §§ 851-855.
19 Id. §§ 351-368.
2 0 Id. §§ 531-537.
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Thus, the presence of a fixed maturity date when a sum
certain becomes due and payable,2 ' a provision for the pay-
ment of interest,2 2 and equal treatment of the shareholder-
creditor with the outside lender 23 are all indicative of bona
fide indebtedness. The fact that an obligation is secured 24
and that repayment thereof is absolute and not conditioned
upon some factor, such as the presence of corporate earn-
ings, 25 leads to a similar conclusion. In some cases the courts
have looked to the nomenclature of a particular security or
instrument.26  The fact that debenture holders have no voice
in the management 27 or no voting rights, absolute or con-
ditional,28 militates against the finding of a proprietary in-
terest. Conversely, in cases involving a high debt to stock
ratio, ". .. a strong inference arises that the entire amount
paid in is a contribution to the corporation's capital .... , 29
Probably the most decisive factor is the issuance of corporate
stock in direct proportion to amounts advanced by stock-
holders. In such a case, the same persons receive identical
amounts whether termed interest, principal or dividends.30
21 New England Lime Co., 13 T.C. 799, 803-04 (1949) (dictum); see Toledo
Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948), aff'd per curia,n, 180 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950).
22 Joseph B. Thomas, 2 T.C. 193, 196 (1943) (dictum).
2 3 See Charles L. Huisking & Co., 4 T.C. 595, 599 (1945).
24 Mullin Bldg. Corp., 9 T.C. 350, 357 (1947) (dictum), aff'd per curiam,
167 F2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1948) ; 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158, 1166 (1945)
(dictum), aff'd per curiam, 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947).
25 Clyde Bacon, Inc., 4 T.C. 1107, 1115 (1945) (dictum); see B.M.C. Mfg.
Corp., P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. 52106.28 New England Lime Co., 13 T.C. 799, 803 (1949) (dictum); Mullin Bldg.
Corp., supra note 24 at 358 (dictum).
27 Clyde Bacon, Inc., supra note 25 at 1115 (dictum) ; Charles L. Huisking
& Co., supra note 23 at 599 (dictum).
28 B.M.C. Mfg. Corp., supra note 25 at 328 (dictum); Clyde Bacon, Inc.,
supra note 25 at 1116 (dictum).
29 Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31, 33 (1950), aff'd per curiais, 192 F.2d 392
(2d Cir. 1951); see George L. Sogg, P-H 1950 T.C. Mem. Dec. 150251,
aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1952); Sam Schnitzer, 13 T.C. 43, 62
(1949), aff'd per curian, 183 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911
(1951).
301432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158, 1165-66 (1945) (dictum), aff'd per
curiamn, 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947); Edward G. Janeway, 2 T.C. 197, 202
(1943) (dictum), aff'd, 147 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1945).
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RECENT CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
Four recent cases, decided by three different federal cir-
cuit courts, may have inadvertently opened the door to un-
warranted tax benefits in the case of prospective investors,
incorporators and shareholders of existing corporations about
to finance embryonic ventures or going concerns. The Third
Circuit in Pollak v. Commissioner 31 and Ansley v. Commis-
sioner, 32 the Fifth Circuit in Edwards v. Allen,33 and the
Sixth Circuit in Cudlip v. Commissioner,34 reached identical
conclusions on substantially similar facts: a shareholder had
guaranteed payment of some corporate obligations; the pri-
mary debtor was unable to comply upon demand for payment
and the guarantor was called upon to discharge his obliga-
tion; payment was made at a time when the corporation was,
in effect, insolvent; the guarantor, not having been re-
imbursed, claimed he had suffered a loss incurred in a trans-
action entered into for profit 35 and therefore deductible in
full. In the Pollak 36 and Cudlip 37 cases, the Tax Court had
held that the loss, in such a case, was limited in deductibility
by the non-business bad debt provision. 8 The Ansley 39 case
stated that the proper deduction would fall under the same
section but held that the taxpayer had not met the burden of
establishing worthlessness of the obligation in the year of
deduction. In the Allen 40 case, the District Court of Georgia
held the payments to be deductible in full as losses incurred
in a transaction entered into for profit. Appeal was taken
in all four decisions. The three Tax Court determinations
were reversed, the taxpayer being permitted an ordinary loss
deduction as in the lower court Allen decision, and the latter
31209 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1954).
32217 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1954).
33216 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1954).
34220 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1955).
35 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c) (2).36Leo L. Pollak, 20 T.C. 376 (1953), re7ld, 209 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1954).
37 William B. Cudlip, P-H 1953 T.C. Mem Dec. 1f 53355, rev'd, 220 F.2d
565 (6th Cir. 1955).
sINT. Rv. CoDE OF 1954, § 166(d).
39 Anne Klein Ansley, P-H 1953 T.C. Mem. Dec. 53323.
40Edwards v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 672 (M.D. Ga. 1953), af'd, 216 F.2d 794
(5th Qir. 1954).
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case was affirmed. It is with these decisions that the writer
takes issue on grounds of legal justification and the possible
consequences apparently overlooked by the courts in arriving
at their conclusion.
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
A thorough analysis requires examination into the re-
sults and reasoning of prior decisional law. If precedent
were the exclusive test of justification, the result of the in-
stant decisions would be condemned ab initio; for it is with-
out doubt that the conclusion of the several circuits flies in
the teeth of an unbroken line of cases holding to the con-
trary.4 1 The propriety of a worthless debt deduction was not
denied and, in fact,. prior to this quadruple innovation, the
question which most often plagued the courts was the diffi-
culty of distinguishing between business and non-business
bad debts. This succession of prior cases proceeded on the
theory that, upon payment by a guarantor, a debt was created
in his favor under the equitable doctrine of subrogation, by
substituting him in the place of the original creditor; 42 that,
as the prime obligor was insolvent at the time of payment,
the debt became worthless upon acquisition eo instanti; 43
finally, that it was ascertained as worthless and properly
charged off in the year of payment. 4  Exceptions were made
to this rule in cases where the principal obligor was no longer
in existence at the time of payment,4 5 where payment was
4 1 See, e.g., Hamlen v. Welch, 116 F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1940); Shiman v.
Commissioner, 60 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932); Whitcher v. Welch, 22 F. Supp.
763 (D. Mass. 1938); George Aftergood, 21 T.C. 60 (1953); Kate Baker
Sherman, 18 T.C. 746 (1952); Warren Leslie, Sr., 6 T.C. 488 (1946); Alice
Dupont Ortiz, 42 B.T.A. 173 (1940), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Helvering
v. Wilmington Trust Co., 124 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 164
(1942); D. W. Pierce, 41 B.T.A. 1261 (1940); H. Rodney Sharp, 38 B.T.A.
166 (1938); Daniel Gimbel, 36 B.T.A. 539 (1937); see E. A. Roberts, 36
B.T.A. 549 (1937).
42Howell v. Commissioner, 69 F2d 447, 451 (8th Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied, 292 U.S. 654 (1934).
43 Daniel Gimbel, supra note 41 at 542 (dictum).4 4 Payment, in fact, must be made and the mere giving of the guarantor's
own notes will not support a deduction. See J. P. Badenhausen, 7 B.T.A. 910(1927).45 Fox v. Commissioner, 190 F2d 101 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Abraham Greenspon,
8 T.C. 431 (1947) ; see 5 MERTENS, FEmmL INcOME TAxAIoN § 28.70 (1953).
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made on a debt outlawed in bankruptcy 46 or where only par-
tial payment had been made by the guarantor.4 7 Sound rea-
soning rests behind these exceptions. Subrogation cannot
create a debt without an obligor against whom it may attach,
nor revive an obligation already discharged by law. Never-
theless, the courts were most careful to mention that a bad
debt deduction would have been proper had the main debtor
been in esse.48
Inspection of these prior cases reveals constant repeti-
tion of the above principles, logical reasoning and well-
founded conclusions. Upon what justifiable grounds then
may the four decisions at bar be predicated? In the Pollak
case, it was stated that a stockholder ". . .who thus loans
his credit to his corporation does so in the hope... that the
corporation, with the additional credit .. .will succeed in
preserving or adding to the value of his stock", and not be-
cause he intends or expects to be repaid by the then existing
and solvent corporation. 49 One cannot help but conclude that
the reasoning of these cases seeks to apply all the factors
requisite for an ordinary bad debt to an obligation arising
by operation of law. The court, in the Pollak decision,
admits the corporation became indebted to its shareholder-
guarantor via subrogation, but nevertheless seems to require
a specific intent to create a debt already created by law.
Were we to subscribe to this reasoning, we would be pre-
sented with the anomalous situation of a debt arising by
operation of law which could not arise because intent to
create it was lacking.
Payment was made under a valid and enforceable con-
tract of guaranty-a voluntary element was totally absent.
Therefore, the debt running to the guarantor was one ac-
quired involuntarily in that he was not legally free to agree
or refuse to make payment. "A voluntary loan which gives
rise to a debt . . .worthless when created or acquired . . .
46 See Frank B. Ingersoll, 7 T.C. 34 (1946).
47 See J. C. Bradford, 22 T.C. 1057 (1954) ; Jeremiah G. Menihan, 29 B.T.A.
169, 174 (1933), aff'd, 79 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 651 (1935).
48 See Fox v. Commissioner, supra note 45 at 105; Abraham Greenspon,
supra note 45 at 434.
49 Pollak v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 57, 58 (3d Cir. 1954).
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may not then or subsequently be deducted as a bad debt.
[But] . . . [w]here the debt is created involuntarily the
foregoing rules do not apply and the taxpayer may be allowed
a bad debt deduction upon the worthlessness of his claim.
This principle finds illustration in the case of an endorsement
... by a surety. ... [T]he debt arises only when the indorser
or surety pays.... In such cases a bad debt deduction may
be allowed, but only if the principal debtor is still in
existence." 50 In the Pollak case, the court draws no dis-
tinction between a case involving an insolvent debtor and a
situation where the obligor is no longer in existence. It is
respectfully submitted that this is a decisive factor. Subro-
gation looks not to one's impoverished state but seeks only to
find one against whom the debt may be said to run. A debt
may arise by operation of law but a debtor may not.
It must also be noted that at least two Tax Court deci-
sions, decided after reversal in the Pollak case, have respect-
fully but quite firmly refused to follow the Third Circuit.5 '
The case of Fox v. Commissioner 52 was also relied upon
as authority for sustaining an ordinary loss deduction. The
facts of that case were substantially as follows: H's wife
(W) had pledged some of her securities as collateral for H's
brokerage account and she subsequently executed a guaranty
thereon. H died at a time when the debit balance of the
account was quite substantial. The securities were sold in
partial satisfaction and W paid the balance after H's insol-
vent estate had been wound up. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed a Tax Court determination I'
limiting the taxpayer to a non-business bad debt deduction,
and held that W had suffered an ordinary loss incurred in a
transaction entered into for profit. Although the "profit"
requirement was justified on the ground that no sound dis-
tinction could be drawn between cutting losses and showing
so See 5 METENs, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATioN § 30.11 (1953).
52 See Peter Stamos, 22 T.C. 885 (1954). "We are aware of the recent
reversal of the Pollak case .... However, after carefully reexamining the
problem we respectfully decline to follow the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in its reversal ... ." Id. at 890. See also Max Greenhouse, P-H 1954
T.C. Mem. Dec. 54250 (citing the Stanzos decision).
52 190 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1951).5 3 Agnes I. Fox, 14 T.C. 1160 (1950).
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a positive gain, the validity of such a statement is debatable. 4
Assuming, arguendo, that the "profit" requirement was sat-
isfied, the circumstances under which the guaranty was given
in the Fox case were quite different from those present in the
four cases under discussion. In the latter, the courts them-
selves stated that the guaranties were made in the hope of
preserving or even ameliorating the value of respective in-
vestments. Was not the real transaction entered into for
profit the original stock purchase and the guaranty but a
secondary or incidental step to insure against loss of value
which eventually would be realized on subsequent disposi-
tion of the stock by sale, redemption or other manner of
disposal? 55 In the Fox case no such situation existed. The
corporation as such was not involved. Avowedly the main
object of the guaranty was to avoid a forfeiture of securities
pledged as collateral. This is not a transaction as may be
said to be inextricably woven with the original purchase of
stock. The guaranty may be looked upon as an independent
and separate transaction quite unlike those involved in the
instant decisions, the significance of which is but secondary
when viewed in its proper context. Furthermore, the court's
finding that no bad debt existed is entirely consistent with
the reasoning of prior decisional law. When W made pay-
ments under the contract of guaranty, H was dead, his in-
solvent estate had been wound up and his executors had
been discharged-there was no possible person against whom
a debt could be said to run.58 Statements in the Fox opinion
itself leave no doubt but that a debt would have arisen had
54 Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 291 (1938) (dictum);
Feine v. McGowan, 188 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum).
55 Thus, in R. W. Hale, 32 B.T.A. 356 (1935), aff'd, 85 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir.
1936), the petitioners sold stock to their sister at cost coupled with a one-year
guarantee, agreeing to reimburse her for any loss she might sustain upon sale
of the stock. The sister sold below cost and the petitioners paid the difference.
The court allowed a loss arising from a transaction entered into for profit
stating, "[t]hat [the guaranty] was only one of several steps, all of which can
and must be retraced to find the origin of the transaction. We thus go back
to June 6, 1929, when the stock was acquired by petitioners. That acquisition
marked the inception of a 'transaction entered into for profit' . . . . The prin-
ciple of relation back to inception is fundamental in the tax statutes." Id. at
357 (emphasis added). See also Carl Hess, 7 T.C. 333 (1946).
56 Peter Stamos, 22 T.C. 885, 890 (1954) (dictum); see Max Greenhouse,
P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. 54250.
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the principal debtor been in existence at the time of pay-
ment. 57 Such statements are reinforced by approval, in the
Fox decision, of the principles of prior case law including the
case of D. W. Pierce,"" which presented a situation identical
to the one presented in the Fox case, save that the main
debtor, although insolvent, was in existence at the time of
the guarantor's payment. It was there held that a non-
business bad debt deduction was proper.
Another reason offered in denying a worthless debt de-
duction is that a debt worthless upon acquisition cannot,
under the wording of the statute, become worthless within
the taxable year. Prior to 1942, the test of deductibility was
whether the debt was ascertained as worthless within the
taxable year. Once this fact was established, the courts had
no difficulty in reasoning that a debt, valueless upon creation,
could be properly charged off.5 9 In 1942 the section was
amended and the standard of determination was changed to
whether the debt became worthless within the taxable period.
As the amendment merely changed the standard from a sub-
jective to an objective one,60 it cannot be seriously contended
that the very real distinction between an ordinary and a capi-
tal loss may be said to hinge on such an attenuated subtlety.
In this same vein, much reliance is placed upon the case
of Eckert v. Commissioner.0  Several cases, including the
ones at bar, have cited the Supreme Court's affirmance of the
Second Circuit Eckert decision as an authoritative holding
to the effect that a debt worthless when acquired cannot be
deducted as such since there is nothing to charge off. A brief
statement of the facts, explained in their proper context and
reinforced by subsequent decisions of the same circuit, may
lead the reader, as it did the writer, to a much different con-
5s The court itself states that the decision ". . . accords with that reached
by the Tax Court in cases involving debtors who have gone out of existence
or been reorganized so that a claim may no longer be enforced against them
[citations omitted]. And it does no violence to the theory that a debt might
arise upon payment by a guarantor where the principal debtor remains still in
existence." Fox v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1951) (emphasis
added).
5841 B.T.A. 1261 (1940).
59 See cases cited note 41 supra.
6oW. A. Dallmeyer, 14 T.C. 1282, 1291 (1950) (dictum).
6142 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1930), aff'd, 283 U.S. 140 (1931).
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elusion. In that case a cash basis taxpayer had acted as an
accommodation indorser on several corporate notes. Insol-
vency resulted and, when called upon to discharge his sec-
ondary liability, he and another delivered their joint personal
note in the amount of the debt. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit denied a "trade and business loss" deduc-
tion and, concerning the taxpayer's contention that he was
entitled to a bad debt deduction, stated: "[n]or is the tax-
payer entitled to a deduction ... as a debt ascertained to be
worthless ... because the debt was worthless when the tax-
payer acquired it." 62 On appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, the decision was affirmed and a statement,
very similar to the above cited quotation, was made. It is
submitted that the precise issue decided in the Eckert case
was that a cash basis taxpayer, upon giving his personal note
in satisfaction of his liability as a guarantor, had made no
payment as such, and there'fore had suffered no loss upon
which a deduction could be predicated.68 The very same cir-
cuit, two years later, in the case of Shiman v. Commissioner,"
hammered home this precise point with one hand and, with
the other, allowed a bad debt deduction although the obliga-
tion was worthless when acquired by the guarantor. The
court in the Shiman case, interpreting the words of the
Supreme Court, stated: "[t]he court refused to allow the
deduction, because [he] . .. was keeping his books on a cash
basis, but it intimated that when he paid he might succeed.
-.. Yet if it were enough to defeat him that the debt was
'worthless when acquired,' the same objection ought to be
good after he had paid; contrary to what was suggested. We
cannot therefore think that the language so thrown out was
intended as an authoritative statement by which we must
be bound." 65
In the Fox case why did the circuit court, the same cir-
cuit interestingly enough which decided both the Eckert and
62 1d. at 159.
63 In Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940), the Supreme Court, on facts
very similar to those of the Eckert case, appears to leave the door slightly more
than ajar for a bad debt deduction at some future time.
64 60 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932).
65 Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
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Shimanr cases, state quite unequivocally that had the primary
obligor been in existence at the time of payment, a worthless
debt deduction would have been proper although, admittedly,
it would have been worthless upon acquisition? Research
has not indicated any repetition, by the Second Circuit, of
its unfortunate dictum in the Eckert case, and apparently
for good cause. As the court itself stated that the giving of
a note by a cash basis taxpayer was not a payment in cash
or equatable thereto, it follows that no right of subrogation
could arise. Absent the operative principles of this equitable
doctrine, no debt may be said to arise which runs in favor
of the guarantor. Naturally no debt may be charged off if
none is in existence. Therefore whatever was said by either
court concerning bad debt deductions was but dictum of the
weakest kind which has, apparently, since been repudiated
by the Second Circuit. The Eckert decision merely required
the taxpayer to clearly reflect his income. Had the deduction
been allowed, he would have been permitted to report on a
cash basis and deduct on an accrual basis merely because he
had shifted the form of the obligation.
"The statement that a debt worthless when acquired
cannot later become worthless has an attractive ring to it,
which no doubt accounts for its frequent repetition. Yet it
is only a rather inaccurate way of saying that a transaction
which is donative from the outset, even though in form a loan
or a guaranty ... was a gift or a contribution to capital." 66
This doctrine merely prohibits a taxpayer from creating a
deduction for himself by advancing funds to someone without
reasonable expectation of repayment-it requires that the
debtor-creditor relationship be real and not fictitious.6 7 Thus
where a loan or guaranty is made at a time when circum-
stances preclude expectation of reimbursement, the transac-
tion sounds in gift and all echos of loan are muted.68 A
66 Cudlip v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 565, 571 (6th Cir. 1955) (dissenting
opinion) (emphasis added).
67 See 5 MraTENs, FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION § 30.11 (1953).
68 See Hoyt v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1944) (guaranty made
at a time when reimbursement, if the guarantor was made to pay, could not
reasonably be expected); Ray Crowder, 19 T.C. 329 (1952) (payments made
at a time when petitioner knew company would not, at any time, have sufficient
funds to repay them).
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worthless debt deduction is denied in such cases as the pay-
ment is deemed to have been voluntarily contributed.6 9 It
is this so-called debt which must be deducted as a loss or not
at all. In the case of a legally enforceable contract of guar-
anty entered into at a time when the prospective debtor is
financially stable, no donative element is present. "1... [T]he
fact that it [the debt] was worthless at the time the payment
creating the debt was made could not defeat the right of the
taxpayer to the deduction since the binding obligation to pay
had arisen long since when the party guaranteed was still
solvent." o The inquiry therefore must be directed to the
debtor's financial condition at the time the guarantor bound
himself to pay upon the obligor's default, and not when actual
payment was made.
The reader may now be uncertain as to the tax conse-
quences attendant a situation where the guarantor makes
payment at a time when the main debtor is no longer in esse.
It is well established that the pertinent sections of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code allowing deductions for worthless debts
and for losses incurred in business or profit transactions are
mutually exclusive.7" Is a guarantor, who has met his obli-
gation, to receive no tax benefit merely because the principal
obligor is no longer in existence? Hardly! Execution of a
guaranty per se does not give rise to a completed transaction
upon which tax consequences may attach. Only after pay-
ment has been made does a debt arise by operation of law. It
has been noted that a guarantor cannot receive subrogee's
rights where the primary debtor is out of existence as there
is no person against whom the debt may attach. The debtor-
creditor relationship not having arisen, it would not violate
sound reasoning to allow a loss deduction in such a situation.
Acquisition of stock marks the first step of a profit-seeking
transaction. A subsequent guaranty is but incidental to a
general desire to avoid loss or even perhaps promote the value
69 See Reading Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 778 (1943).
70 W. F. Young, Inc. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 159, 165 (1st Cir. 1941).
See Hamlen v. Welch, 116 F.2d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 1940); George Aftergood,
21 T.C. 60, 63 (1953).
71 Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 189 (1934)
(dictum).
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of one's proprietary interest. If the corporate entity has dis-
appeared at the time of payment, we may assume that the
guarantor has previously disposed of his stock in one manner
or another. Thus, a completed transaction [stock disposi-
tion] has preceded the payment. In such a situation, hind-
sight affords the opportunity of detachment and the payment
may be regarded as a transaction in and of itself imbued
with the "profit" qualifications of its completed brother
transaction.
In the new Code, Congress added a subdivision to the
section dealing with worthless debts. Section 166 (f), in
essence, provides that a payment by one other than a corpo-
ration in discharge of a guarantor's or indemnitor's liability
on a non-corporate obligation, the proceeds of which loan
were used in the borrower's trade or business, shall be deemed
to give rise to a business bad debt deduction if the obligation
was worthless at the time of payment.72 This section presents
new problems when compared to the four decisions under
discussion. Although it does not purport to deal with cor-
porate obligations, one cannot help but conclude that it con-
flicts with a portion of the reasoning of Pollak and the other
cases. It will be remembered that one of the reasons for
denying bad debt deductions was that a debt worthless when
acquired could not thereafter become worthless. Section
166(f) seems to discount this reason summarily as its ap-
plicability is, in fact, limited to instances where the debt was
worthless at the time of the guarantor's payment. If the
reasoning of these cases is sound, there appears to be no valid
objection to the applicability of the same argument to non-
corporate obligations. If such is the case, this new provision
would be emasculated to a large extent, if not completely, as
the deduction would fall under a different section entirely
(loss incurred from a transaction entered into for profit).
It cannot be assumed that this new section would have been
enacted if its applicability was thought, in any way, to be
perfunctory. It is interesting to note that only the circuit
72 It should be noted that, as a result of this provision, a taxpayer who but
partially discharges his liability as guarantor may deduct this amount if the bal-
ance of the obligation is worthless at the time of payment. Compare with
cases cited in note 47 supra.
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court decision in the Pollak case and the district court opin-
ion in the Allen case had been handed down before the con-
gressional hearings on the new Code. The decisions of the
Tax Court in the Cudlzp and Ansley cases upholding bad debt
deductions had been published prior to the hearings, but the
reversals did not occur until after the effective date of the
new Code. Although the legislative history of this section
throws no light upon this confused state of affairs, it is the
writer's opinion that Section 166(f) was enacted not with
the congressional intent of classifying an obligation worthless
when acquired as a bad debt, but with a different purpose in
mind. It seems that Section 166 (f) was introduced to allow
ordinary loss treatment where the taxpayer had made pay-
ment pursuant to a guaranty obligation which had been con-
tracted in a business transaction, though not necessarily in
his own trade or business. Notwithstanding this new provi-
sion and the section allowing deduction of expenses incurred
in the production or collection of income,73 it seems that the
deductibility of a direct loan, similar to one described in Sec-
tion 166(f), must still be governed by the non-business bad
debt section where there was no direct connection with the
taxpayer's business as such.74
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE DECISIONS
The tax advantages of debt financing have already been
mentioned along with the pitfalls of "thin incorporation." It
has also been seen that two of the most important elements
guiding the courts in effecting a metamorphosis from debt to
stock has been the high ratio of borrowed to invested capital,
especially where the holdings of each interest are proportion-
ate among the respective shareholders. But of what concern
is the result of these decisions in this area of the law?
Assume the following situation: A, B and C, doing business
as partners, wish to incorporate. Each has $10,000 to invest
and an attorney is consulted on the most profitable manner
73 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(1).
74 See Guterman, Some Problems In The Deduction For Bad Debts, 63 HARV.
L. REv. 832, 836 (1950); Hanigsberg, Distinguishing a Fully Deductible Loss
From a Non-Business Bad Debt, N.Y.U. 7TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 914 (1949).
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of incorporation. He realizes that if $30,000 is immediately
sunk into capital stock, a subsequent failure of the business
will result only in capital loss (worthless stock). A reason-
able balance between stock and debt capital will put the pros-
pective investors in no better position if the corporate enter-
prise should subsequently prove unsuccessful. He is also
aware of the possible consequences of undercapitalization and
realizes that incorporation with, for example, $3,000 of capi-
tal stock and $27,000 in bonds, would present a structure
bathed in suspicion. Having read the instant cases, he ad-
vises the following plan: the corporation is to issue $3,000
worth of stock, $1,000 to A, B and C; if additional funds are
required a loan may be obtained from an outside third party;
this advance is to be personally guaranteed by A, B and C
and perhaps even secured by property worth approximately
*27,000-the identical amount withheld upon incorporation.
Several months later the corporation, now in need of addi-
tional funds, secures a loan from a bank which is guaranteed
by the shareholders. The advances prove of no avail and a
petition in bankruptcy is filed. The bank calls for repayment
and A., B and C discharge their obligation in full. The rea-
soning of these decisions would now afford all three share-
holders ordinary loss deductions which could be offset against
any income from whatever source derived. Although the cor-
poration has been financed, in the eyes of these cases no loan
has been made and no additional stock has been purchased.
This hypothecation would presumptively hold true regardless
of the number of times this funding scheme was carried out.
Several reasons militate against the desirability of such
a result. The mere fact that a taxpayer has risked his money
by guaranteeing a corporate obligation, instead of making a
direct loan or investing in additional stock, should not change
the nature of the loss by obscuring the true nature of the
transaction. Had the guaranty been made without a profit
motive and not in one's trade or business, no deduction would
be permissible under the result of these decisions. 75 Had the
T5 Moreover, if the corporation was financially rehabilitated thereby, no de-
duction would be permitted. See Jeremiah G. Menihan, 29 B.T.A. 169 (1933),
aff'd, 79 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 651 (1935).
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loan been made without an intervening guaranty the original
creditor would have been entitled to a bad debt deduction
upon non-payment. The guarantor, after he has paid, is
merely subrogated to the creditor's rights; 76 he is now the
creditor on the same claim and hence the result should be the
same upon non-payment as in the case of the original creditor.
If the guaranty device is viewed as but a step toward a
desired result, it is seen that such a transaction is nothing
more or less than an indirect loan. The theoretical advance,
created when the funds were originally made available to the
corporation, now ripens into actuality when the guarantor is
made to pay. This perspective clears the way for both ad-
ministrative and judicial condemnation of this and similar
tax avoidance plans. As the payment is now considered a
corporate loan, it may be compared with the amount of the
shareholder's proprietary interest and with any other direct
loans he may have made; the function of the latter perhaps
being only to dispel suspicion and lend an air of reality to
the transaction. Once all these pieces have been fitted into
their proper context, the government may now look to the
overall debt to stock ratio and to the pro rata holdings of
each interest. Assume it is found that A, B and C each guar-
anteed $9,000 of the total corporate obligations or that each
received bonds in the face amount of $4,500 and had guar-
anteed $4,500 of the corporate loans. Numerous combina-
tions, some more difficult to detect than others, are possible,
but close scrutiny and proper evaluation will ferret out the
real purpose behind these and similar plans. If the corpora-
tion is "put back on its feet" and repays its guarantors, the
way is clear for a finding of a taxable dividend. Should the
enterprise later prove unsuccessful, the appropriate deduc-
tion by the shareholder, in most instances, will be that of a
non-business bad debt, thus equating tax treatment in cases
of guaranty to instances of additional capital investments or
direct loans which thereafter prove worthless.
Another consideration closely allied to this situation is
the questionable applicability of the corporate accumulated
76Howell v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 447, 451 (8th Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied, 292 U.S. 654 (1934).
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earnings tax, which is aimed at corporations formed, or
availed of, for the purpose of avoiding the surtax on share-
holders by allowing earnings to accumulate.7 7  Assuming the
existence of a bona fide relationship of debtor-creditor be-
tween corporation and stockholder, a retention of corporate
earnings to retire outstanding obligations seems to fall out-
side the scope of the forbidden purpose.7 8  In such a case,
the accumulation serves a proper and necessary business
purpose. But a retention of earnings to repay "debts" of an
excessively "thin" corporation would be difficult to justify.7 9
Quite possibly the government might invoke the accumulated
earnings tax in several ways. Success might be attained by
attacking the character of the alleged debt, claiming that,
for tax purposes, the indebtedness represented invested capi-
tal. Once the "advances" are deemed capital contributions,
the purpose for the accumulation disappears and successful
advancement of this argument would certainly cast some
doubt upon the propriety of setting aside earnings for annual
interest payments and, eventually, repayment of principal
amounts. Without going as far, it might well be proposed
that the very creation of an excessive corporate debt struc-
ture indicates that the corporation was formed, or utilized,
to avoid surtax imposition upon its shareholders.8 0 In fur-
therance of these arguments it may be pointed out that such
a surtax risk is involved in any case in which the accumula-
tion of profits may be thought to be for the benefit of
the stockholders rather than for purposes germane to the
business."" This principle may find illustration in a situation
77 See INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 532(a).
78 ". . . [W]e think petitioner was entitled to anticipate the substantial
amounts which would fall due on its obligations in the next few years . . .
section 102 did not require it to be an incorrigible optimist and distribute
earnings, which unless good business continued, would surely be needed within
3 years to meet fixed maturities." Gazette Tel. Co., 19 T.C. 692, 707 (1953),
aff'd, 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) (more than one-third of these obligations
were due to stockholders); see U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.102-3 (1953);
Holland, Tax Effects of Stockholder Loans to Corporations, N.Y.U. 9TrH INsT.
oN FED. TAX. 1083, 1101-02 (1951); 7 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§40.12 (1953).
79 See Cary, Accumulations Beyond The Reasonable Needs Of The Business:
The Dilemma Of Section 102(c), 60 1LAv. L. REv. 1282, 1302-03 (1947).
80 See Holland, supra note 78, at 1101-02.
81 See Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693 (1943) ; Beim
Co. v. Landy, 113 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1940).
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where the purpose of the accumulation is to free the share-
holders from their guaranty obligations, rather than to retire
corporate debts incurred in bona fide funding operations.
Quite apart from the situations heretofore discussed,
imposition of the corporate surtax has been successfully main-
tained in another type of situation. Where one who is sub-
stantially the sole shareholder lends, without interest, large
amounts of his personal funds to a corporation which con-
tinues to accumulate profits without distribution, applica-
tion of the surtax has been upheld.82 The reasoning of these
cases centers upon the fact that the taxpayer, well advanced
in surtax brackets in his own right, by making such loans,
has precluded his own normal use or investment of the funds
which would have yielded additional amounts of taxable in-
come to him. Thus, the income realized by corporate invest-
ment of these amounts was taxed at a fixed corporate rate
and, as no distribution was made, the taxpayer completely
escaped the individual surtax.
What effect, if any, will be given an attempted circum-
vention of the accumulated earnings tax by interposition of
a third party creditor where a shareholder has guaranteed
the obligation? Successful imposition of the surtax appears
more difficult in this situation. Consonant with the writer's
previous conclusion, if payment has been made by the guar-
antor, he may now be regarded as a creditor deemed to have
loaned the exact amount he has been made to pay. Therefore,
the same reasoning obtains as in situations involving direct
shareholder loans. If, however, the corporation itself makes
the payment, justification of a similar result on the corporate
level still rests within the confines of sound reasoning. It
has been previously noted that an unequal debt to stock ratio
is a factor to be considered where transmutation of borrowed
into equity capital is sought. Several Tax Court decisions
have not restricted this ratio to merely "inside" or share-
holder loans but have wisely included funds secured from
outsiders. 83 Once the entire amount of all debts is included
82 See Reynard Corp., 37 B.T.A. 552 (1938); Rands, Inc., 34 B.T.A. 1094
(1936).
83 See, e.g., George L. Sogg, P-H 1950 T.C. Mer. Dec. 1 50251, aff'd per
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in this ratio, it may now be proposed that the very creation
of a top-heavy debt structure indicates the presence of the
forbidden purpose.
Although the doctrine of constructive dividend is well
known to the courts, successful imposition of such a tax at
the shareholder level is admittedly more uncertain than
in situations involving repayment of direct stockholder
advances.8 4 Similarly, a denial of corporate interest deduc-
tions becomes more uncertain when a third party has been
interposed.85
CONCLUSION
Sound economic reasons underlie promotion and expan-
sion of business enterprise. If these attempts are met at
each turn with restrictive taxation, a large stimulus to initia-
tive disappears. On the other hand, and more specifically,
abuse of tax laws in the area of corporate financing cannot
be condoned. It is believed that the device of "outside loans"
and "inside guaranties" was not envisaged by the courts of
the several circuits as potential avenues of tax avoidance.
In many instances, sound business practice may dictate the
necessity of third party loans secured by shareholder guar-
anties in lieu of obtaining necessary capital by stock or bond
issues. If such be the case, the burden of explanation is not
an excessively onerous one on the taxpayer. Where, however,
such a course is not reasonably justifiable, let this apparently
isolated funding transaction be viewed in the light of the
overall corporate structure. Only one question need be
asked: WHY? 
8 6
curiam, 194 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1952) ; Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd
per curiam, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951).
84 Cf. Ruben v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Fred F. Fischer,
P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. 47131; see Gazette Tel. Co., 19 T.C. 692 (1953),
aff'd, 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) (There the Commissioner originally claimed
that corporate repayments to an outside creditor were in fact distributions to
shareholders. In his brief, however, the Commissioner conceded that these
amounts were proper deductions.).
85 See Gazette Tel. Co., supra note 84.
81 It is interesting to note that the Eighth Circuit, in Putnam v. Commissioner,
5 CCH 1955 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (55-2 U.S.T.C.) 9604 (8th Cir. Aug. 11,
1955), recently stated that it would not follow the Cudlip, Pollak and Allen
cases.
